Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 11, Number 2 (August 1973)

Forfar v. The Township of East Gwillimbury
Hartley R. Nathan

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Commentary

Citation Information
Nathan, Hartley R.. "Forfar v. The Township of East Gwillimbury." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 11.2 (1973) : 335-340.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol11/iss2/9

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.

Article 9

1973]

Case Comment

Forfar v. The Township of East Gwillimbury
EVASION OF SUBDIVISION CONTROL LEGISLATION

The recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Forfar v. The Township of East Gwillimbury' appears to have confirmed the fact that the death
knell has finally rung on the various schemes devised to circumvent subdivision control legislation in Ontario. Before turning to the facts of the case,
some reference to the background of the present legislation is in order.
Controls over the subdivision of land in Ontario have only been imposed
since the enactment of the Planning Act 1946.2 This Act provided that areas
of subdivision control could be established by municipalities on a local option
basis. Once established, no division of land was permitted other than by the
registration of a plan of subdivision. An amendment made in 19473 established additional methods by which land could be divided, including a system
of individual consents by local planning boards. In 1964, authority to grant
consents was transferred from the planning board to the committee of adjustment.4 Jurisdiction over subdivision control is now found in s.29(2) of the
Planning Act.5
The Courts in Forfarwere concerned with the interpretation of s.26(1),
a predecessor to the present s.29(2). The facts of the Forfar case can be set
out briefly. H. Bruce Forfar, the husband of the applicant, held some 20 acres
of property in the Township under a grant to uses. In a series of transactions
completed in his solicitor's office within a brief period of time, he executed
a deed to himself in fee simple and a deed from himself to his solicitor's secre1(1972), 28 D.L.R. (3d) 512, aff'g. (1971), 3 0.R. 337 (C.A.), 20 D.L.R. (3d) 377,
rev'g order of Osler J., October 20th, 1970 (unreported). The text of the Supreme Court of
Canada decision is reproduced later in this comment. For a fuller report on the proceedings, see the Toronto Globe & Mail, October 13th, 1972.
2S.O. 1946, c. 71. It is not the purpose of this comment to trace the development or
the need for subdivision control. See e.g. J.B. Milner, An Introduction to Subdivision
Control Legislation(1965), 43 Can. Bar Rev. 49; G. Adler, Land planning by administrative
regulation (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968) at 11; W. S. Rogers, Practice
Before Committee of Adjustment, Law Society of Upper Canada Special Lectures (1970),
at217.
3 S.O. 1947, c. 75, s. 9.
4
The Planning Amendment Act, S.O. 1964, c. 90, s. 1.
5R.S.O. 1970, c. 349.
6R.S.O. 1960, c. 296 as amended by 1960-61, c. 76, s. 1 and 1968-69, c. 95, s. 3.
At the time of the transactions under review that section read in part as follows:
"26(1) The council of a municipality may by by-law designate any area within the
municipality as an area of subdivision control and thereafter no person shall convey land
in the area by way of a deed or transfer, or mortgage or charge land in the area or
enter into an agreement of sale and purchase of land in the area, or enter into any
agreement that has the effect of granting the use of or right in land in the area directly
or by entitlement to renewal for a period of twenty-one years or more unless,
(a) the land is described in accordance with and is within a registered plan of subdivision; or
(b) the grantor, mortgagor or vendor does not retain the fee or the equity of redemption
inany land abutting the land that is being conveyed or otherwise dealt with;
(e) the consent
(i) of the committee of adjustment is given to convey, mortgage, charge or enter into
an agreement with respect to the land... ."
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tary to uses, reserving to himself a general power of appointment. On June
10th, 1970, he executed a series of deeds exercising the power of appointment
in favour of himself, Mrs. Forfar and H. B. Forfar Limited, a corporation
controlled by him in a "checkerboarding" fashion, with the result that no two
contiguous lots or parcels on this unregistered plan were vested in any one
person or corporation. Mrs. Forfar sought a mandamus to compel the issuance
of a building permit covering a single family dwelling on one of the parcels
of land vested in her.
The matter at issue was whether or not the technique employed by Mr.
Forfar for subdividing the 20 acres escaped the prohibition contained in s.26(l)
and fell within the exception set out in s.26(1)(b) thereof. If not, the land
would have to be described in accordance with a plan of subdivision or the
consent of
the committee of adjustment to the conveyances would have to be
7
obtained.
When the matter came on for hearing before Osler J.,8 counsel for the
applicant frankly admitted the land in question had been subdivided in accordance with the method described by Fraser J. in Re Carter and Congram.9
There, the vendor, in a prior conveyance, granted and conveyed a power
of appointment to himself and in the same deed granted to one J to uses. The
vendor proposed to sell part of this land and complete the transaction by
exercising the power of appointment by appointing to the purchaser to her
own use in fee simple. Fraser J. considered that the effect of the original grant
to uses to J was that J, the grantee, held the fee and the use pending exercise
of the power of appointment by the grantor. The grantor having retained
only the power of appointment, he did not "retain the fee or the equity of
redemption in any land abutting the land that is being conveyed . . ." and
fell within the exception in s.26(1)(b). Accordingly, no consent of the committee of adjustment was required to the sale of the part of the land in
question.
After discussing the cases and textbook authorities, he concluded:
"A fee is a special kind of real property. A power is not a property
interest; much less is it a fee".10
Although Osler J. in Forfar recognized that the various amendments
made to s.26 were intended to make that section all-encompassing, he agreed
with the reasoning of Fraser J. in Re Carter and Congram and allowed the
7 Neither would have been desirable for Mr. Forfar. The procedure to be followed
in registering a plan of subdivision can be lengthy, costly and cumbersome. See s. 33 of
the Planning Act (supra, note 5) for the procedure and some of the considerations in the
registration process. The committee of adjustment has the power to impose conditions on
any consent to a severance. It may only give its consent "provided that the committee is
satisfied that a plan of subdivision . . . of the land described in the application is not
necessary for the proper and orderly development of the municipality". See s. 42(3) and
(10) of the Planning Act (supra) and W. S. Rogers (supra,note 2) at 216.
8 Supra, note 1.
9 (1970), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 550, [1970] 1 O.R. 800.
10 Id., at 807. A grant to uses is most often used as a device to avoid the attachment
of a dower interest.
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application. In so doing, he declined to accept the argument of the respondents
that the word "fee" should be interpreted liberally as including the power of
appointment retained by Mr. Forfar."
Schroeder J.A.2 delivered the judgment of the Court of Appeal reversing
Osler J.'s decision.'
His Lordship referred to13 Re Redmond and Rothschild' 4 and quoted
the following from the judgment of Kelly I. A. speaking for the Court of
Appeal:
As used here, the word "fee" is not a word which is precisely appropriate and must
be interpreted in the light of the context in which it is used.
The purpose of that part of the Act is to prevent, otherwise than with the approval
of the Minister given after consultation with the local municipal authorities, the
severance into two or more independent ownerships of land held under one ownership, if the portions into which it is sought to be severed form part of the holding
of one owner, and if the external boundaries of that holding however described,
form a continuous line....
Having in mind the purpose of part II of the Planning Act and the context of the
portions of the Act in which the words appear, it is my opinion that the retention
of which the Legislature sought to prohibit by s.26 was that of the power to dispose
of the abutting lands as distinguished from an interest in those lands; 'fee' must
lands as confers on the holder
accordingly refer to such an interest in the abutting
15
thereof the absolute right to dispose of the lands.

After reviewing the legislative history of the Planning Act, Schroeder
J. A. considered that s.26(1) of the Act, as it read both before and after an
amendment made in 1970,16 "had for its object the prevention of the unrestricted subdivision of land and had no reference to any particular mode of
conveyance.' 7
11 Counsel had urged him to follow the so-called "liberal" aproach that he was
said to have taken in Re Cait and Lemrac Holdings Ltd., [1969] 2 O.R. 544. The device
whereby two simultaneous conveyances, each of one-half of the property, were delivered
in the same envelope to the same solicitor, was found by him not to be "bona fide" and
was held not to fall within the exception in s. 26(1) (b). Subsection (5a) was added to
s.26 to deal with simultaneous conveyances. See s.I(1) of An Act to Amend The Planning
Act S.O. 1971 c.2, which came into effect April 28th, 1971.
12 Supra, note 1.
131d., at 344.
14(1971), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 538, [1971] 1 O.R. 436. Osler J.'s decision in Forfar and
this decision were rendered respectively on October 20th and October 21st, 1970.
Schroeder J. A. supra, note 6 at 341 noted that Re Carter and Congram was not referred
to in Re Redmond and Rothschild except apparently by counsel in argument.
15 Id., at 438-39.
16This amendment was contained in s.1(2)(b) of An Act to Amend the Planning
Act, S.O. 1970, c.72 which received Royal Assent June 26th, 1970. S.26(1) was amended
to include a person granting, assigning or exercising a power of appointment. The amendment appears to have been made to plug the loophole created by the Re Carter and
Congramdecision.
By s.1 of this Act subdivision control was made to apply to the whole of the Province by
the force of the Act alone.
17Supra,note 1 at 343-44.
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He pointed out that here Mr. Forfar clearly had dominion over the fee
to exercise as he saw fit, and went on:
It is against the retention of such power of control over alienation of the property
abutting the land conveyed or otherwise dealt with that the prohibitory provisions
of s. 26 are aimed. Adopting the construction placed upon the word "fee" in Re
Redmond and Rothschild,... I come inevitably to the conclusion that H. Bruce
Forfar has subdivided his holding in contravention of the townships subdivision
control By-law 510 and thereby infringed the provisions of s. 26(1) of the Planning
Act. 18

In the Supreme Court of Canada, Martland J. delivered the oral judgment
for the Court.
We are all in agreement with the reasons delivered on behalf of the Court of Appeal
by Mr. Justice Schroeder. We think that, fairly construed, the words 'retain the
fee' embrace not only the holder of the fee, but as well, the holder of the power
over the fee, and we also think that the term 'grantor' must have a concordant
meaning.
Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed with costs.

At first blush, when considering the broad interpretation given to the
word "fee" one might think of what was said by Humpty Dumpty to Alice in
Through the Looking-Glass:
When I use a word it means just what I choose it to mean -

neither more or less.

In fact, the opposite is true. Schroeder J. A. in Forfar did no more than

give effect to a most basic canon of statutory interpretation. Where the language used is capable of more than one meaning, the court's duty is to
construe the language in accordance with the objects of the statute in mind. 19
As His Lordship pointed out, the word "fee" was given a restricted
technical meaning by Fraser J. in Re Carter and Congram, while in Re
Redmond and Rothschild the Court of Appeal had given it an enlarged
meaning more in keeping with the intent of the Act. The determining factor
was that of dominion or control over the power of disposal.
It was this latter view that was adopted by the Court of Appeal in Forfar
and confirmed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
This view was once again applied recently in 229822 Realty Ltd. v.
Reid.20 Here the parties entered into an agreement of purchase and sale for
some 148 acres of land. Before closing, the Township of Chinguacousy
notified the vendor of its intention to expropriate a strip of the land adjacent
to a highway amounting to some three-quarters of an acre. The vendor as
agent for the purchaser negotiated compensation, and ultimately conveyed
Id., at 344.
19 G.T.R. v. Hepworth Silica Pressed Brick Co. (1915), 51 S.C.R. 81 at 85. S. 10 of
the Interpretation Act R.S.O. 1970, c.225 is also support for this proposition. It reads as
follows:
"Every Act shall be deemed to be remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the
doing of anything that the Legislature deems to be for the public good or to prevent or
punish the doing of any thing that it deems to be contrary to the public good, and shall
accordingly receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will
best ensure the attainment of the object of the Act according to its true intent, meaning
and spirit."
20 (1973), 30 D.L.R. (3d) 542, [1973] 1 O.R. 194.
28
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to the Township what was thought to be the desired strip. By reason of a
mis-description, this deed did not cover any of the vendor's land and this
was discovered by the purchaser's solicitor on the day of closing. The vendor
then tendered a deed covering the land under the agreement less the land
intended to be deeded to the township. The purchaser's solicitor refused to
close on the basis that the vendor still had title to the abutting lands. The
vendor sued for a declaration that the purchaser had defaulted and the
purchaser counterclaimed for the return of its deposit and damages. At trial
Keith J. held for the purchaser.
The Court of Appeal reversed the decision at trial. McGillivray J. A.
in delivering the Court's judgment referred to Re Redmond and Rothschild,
which he noted had not been cited to Keith J. He considered that the township
had an equitable title to the strip of land, and following Re Redmond and
Rothschild, concluded that the vendor "had no longer the right to dispose of
the said strip of land. '21 This being so, the purchaser's solicitor wrongly
refused to carry out the transaction. Forfarwas not referred to in the decision
although McGillivray J.A. was a member of that court.
Where does the law now stand as a result of the Forfar decision? It
appears to be a distinct possibility that if a court is satisfied that an artificial
series of transactions was entered into as part of a scheme devised to circumvent the provisions of the Act, the court might find the attempt abortive.2
If this were so, the effect of the Supreme Court of Canada's pronouncement
in Forfarmay be to put to rest the best laid plans of lawyers to assist clients
in evading the intention of the legislature to control the subdivision of land
in Ontario.
The courts have long been dealing with efforts to evade statutes. As
was said over 350 years ago:
The office of the judge is to make such construction as will suppress the mischief
and advance the remedy and to suppress all evasions for the continuance of the
mischief.

23

Will the decision in Forfarhave retroactive effect so as to put in jeopardy
the titles of those land-owners who have subdivided their lands in accordance
with the technique approved in Re Carter and Congram?2 4 On this question,
Schroeder J.A. in Forfar was of the view that this was not a consideration
for the Court. He said:
Any person whose property rights are thus prejudiced must seek his relief in the
25
appropriate quarter.
21 Id., at 198.'
22
At the time of writing, the Court of Appeal had only just concluded its hearings
which commenced February 12th, 1973, on various hypothetical questions referred to
it by the Lieutenant-Governor by Order in Council 2858/71 dated September 19, 1971.
The questions referred to the Court are set out at page X of the Ontario Reports January
5th, 1973. The questions were referred to the Court following the questioning of the
"checker-boarding" scheme adopted by Whiterock Estates Development Corporation Ltd.,
which subdivided land in rural Ontario. The question raised by me is a paraphrase of

question no. 9.**
23
Magdalen College Case (1616) 11 R.E.P. 71(b).
24
Supra, note 9.
25
Supra, note 1 at 346.
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This appears to be a reference to the solicitors who acted in the various
transactions.
In the Supreme Court of Canada, Spence J.asked counsel during argument in Forfar:
If John Brown chooses to rely on a single court judgment that holds valid a scheme
and is26avowedly worked out to go around the statute, don't you think he was pretty
bold?

What follows now? The writer's view is that the Legislature has no choice
in the first instance but to introduce appropriate remedial legislation to
validate the titles of those affected by the Forfar decision. 27
That the Legislature will do at least this is virtually certain, but what
form any remedial legislation will take is not so certain.
The Legislature should realize by now that the way in which the legislation is framed and the piece-meal amendments made to the Act over the
past 25 years have only led to constant litigation. The inadequacy of the
present system was clearly brought home by Kelly J.A. in Re Redmond and
Rothschild. In discussing the purpose of s.26(l) of the Act, as it then stood,
he said:
While in my opinion it was not the intention of the Legislature to place any restriction upon dealings with lands where such lands comprised the entire holdings of
the owner or owners attempting to deal therewith, a difficult question is presented
arising from the mode which the Legislature employed and the language which it
used to carry out that purpose.28

A fresh approach to subdivision control legislation in Ontario is obviously warranted.
Hartley R. Nathan*
*Member of the Ontario Bar, Toronto.
The writer of this comment wishes to express his appreciation to Allen Weinberg,
student-at-law, who assisted in its preparation.
**Addendum
Unfortunately for the writer but fortunately for the profession, on March 22nd,
1973 the Court of Appeal rendered its opinion on the questions referred to it. Supra,
note 22. The Court's answer to question no. 9 is rather circumspect but it does indicate
that if it is the type of transaction "which constitutes a deceit upon the public administration, a fraud upon The Planning Act ...... the transaction would be held invalid."
See p. 48 of the judgment (unreported). At p. 49 the Court explained Forfar in these
words: "...... while admittedly Forfar employed a scheme devised to circumvent
s.26 of The Planning Act, the fact that such a scheme was concocted and applied was
entirely irrelevant. The transaction was bad because it fell squarely within the prohibitory
words of the Act." A full analysis of the Court's opinion as it might relate to this case
comment is not possible, but students are urged to read the entire opinion for an
exhaustive review of the relevant cases on property law and statutory interpretation.
26
As reported in the Globe & Mail, supra,note 1.
27 Remedial legislation is not new. S.10(3) of The Planning Amendment Act, S.O.
1967, c.75 stated that the contravention before June 15, 1967 of s.26 or its predecessor
"does not have and shall be deemed never to have had the effect of preventing the conveyance or creation of any interest in land."
28
Supra, note 14 at 439.

